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I. Introduction
On January 18, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (the “URAA”), which 
retroactively restored copyright protection to foreign works in the public 
domain.1  Despite its effect on the status of the public domain in the 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment rights of those using the works, 
the Court held that the Act brought the United States into compliance with 
international copyright measures.2  That same day, the global blackout 
against the Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) and Preventing Real Online 
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act 
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2014.  New York
University, B.M. Music Business.  I would like to thank my family, friends, and mentors for their
support in drafting this Note.  Special thanks to the Comm/Ent staff for their diligent
contributions to this Note and our entire issue.
1. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012).
2. Id. at 893–94.
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(PROTECT IP Act, also known as “PIPA”) occurred.  To protest the SOPA 
and PIPA Acts sitting in Congress, the largest search engines and social 
media sites in the world shut down for twenty-four hours.3  Doing so sent a 
clear message to Congress: legislation that stifles free speech and harms the 
exchange of information among both domestic and foreign channels will 
not be tolerated. 
How do we reconcile the needs of content creators and content users, 
both domestically and abroad?  On the one hand, we have the Supreme 
Court creating barriers around information previously enjoyed by the 
public.4  On the other, we have the public participating in protests against 
legislation that could block the flow of future information.  The 
contradiction between judicial action and public outcry against proposed 
legislation exemplified in these events makes it clear that current copyright 
law has not been able to accommodate growing concern over reciprocal 
protection of copyrighted works among countries.  Copyright law requires 
a global scope now more than ever. 
What current copyright law fails to accurately take into account is the 
power of “prosumers,” professional consumers that customize and create 
new content to fit their needs.5  A handful of streaming services—Pandora, 
Spotify, Netflix, and Hulu—recognize this trait by offering prosumers 
content based on their interests and providing a platform to customize such 
content.  As pioneers in their respective fields, each of these services has 
been bombarded with legal issues from their royalty compensation systems 
to whether such royalties should be entitled to special treatment.6  
However, keeping these services running efficiently reduces potential 
infringement.  If prosumers aren’t given a platform to enjoy content, they 
will create one, by either developing systems that infringe on copyrights or 
exchanging information on illegal downloading sites.  When streaming 
stops at a country’s IP address, prosumers will find a way. 
Currently, streaming services are offered piecemeal to several countries 
depending on federal copyright schemes.  Despite its hundreds of millions 
of listeners, music streaming service Pandora has only just recently 
expanded to Australia because of its issues paying noninteractive webcast 
3. Gregory Alan Barnes, SOPA, PIPA: Pause and Reset, THE HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/205459-sopa-pipa-pause-and-reset. 
4. Elizabeth Townsend Gard, Copyright Law v. Trade Policy: Understanding the Golan
Battle Within the Tenth Circuit, 34 Colum. J.L. & Arts 131, 198–99 (2011). 
5. Peter Suciu, The Rise of the Prosumer, TECHCRUNCH (June 15, 2007), http://techcrunch
.com/2007/06/15/the-rise-of-the-prosumer/. 
 6. Infra Part II.
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royalties.7  Meanwhile, interactive webcaster Spotify quickly expanded to 
several territories after initially being blocked by copyright laws in each 
country.8  Comparatively, video-streaming service Hulu has yet to expand 
into territories where similar service Netflix has proliferated and thrived, 
offering a variety of content to match the compensation system in each 
country it serves.9  This lack of a unified system for streaming services 
contributes to the very infringement that content creators seek to avoid. 
Studies show that territories see a drop in illegal downloading activity 
when they offer legal streaming services, a platform through which creators 
get paid even if the user does not buy their end product—the album or 
DVD.10  A global system will not only adhere to the URAA as part of the 
Berne Convention, it will also rejuvenate the process of licensing revenue 
for content creators. 
This note explores the possibility of creating a standardized licensing 
and royalty computation process for digital content, with an emphasis on 
music, film, and television streaming services.  Part II provides a brief 
overview of copyright law for media and the current royalty collection 
system for streaming services.  Part III analyzes previous approaches to a 
multinational licensing system and addresses how copyright acts as a 
barrier to entry for legitimate web-based services.  Finally, Part IV 
proposes an international market for licensing as well as computing, 
collecting, and distributing royalties for online streaming performances. 
Part V considers the likelihood of reaching a consensus on the international 
market and meeting the end goal of providing protection to content creators 
while respecting the rights of prosumers. 
7. See Darrell Etherington, Pandora Internet Radio Launches Fully in Australia and New
Zealand with Mobile Apps For iOS and Android, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 10, 2012), http://techcrunch 
.com/2012/12/10/pandora-internet-radio-launches-fully-in-australia-and-new-zealand-with-mobile-
apps-for-ios-and-android/. 
8. Full List of Territories Where Spotify is Available, SPOTIFY, support.spotify.com/
uk/learn-more/faq/#/article/Availability-in-overseas-territories (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
9. See Julianne Pepitone, Netflix Expands to 43 New Countries, CNN MONEY (July 5,
2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/05/technology/netflix_international/index.htm; and Shane 
McGlaun, Netflix Now Available in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland, SLASH GEAR (Oct. 
19, 2012), http://www.slashgear.com/netflix-now-available-in-sweden-denmark-norway-and-
finland-19252816/; see also Richard Lawler, Hulu Launches Streaming in Japan for About $20 
US Monthly, ENGADGET BLOG (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.engadget.com/2011/09/01/hulu-
launches-streaming -in-japan-for-about-20-us-monthly/. 
10. Rebecca Guerrero, Internet Radio Decreases Amount of Illegal Music Downloads, THE 
PROSPECTOR, Nov. 20, 2012, http://www.utepprospector.com/news/internet-radio-decreases-
amount-of-illegal-music-downloads-1.2957417#.URnZYlpU4wk. 
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II. Background: The Current State of Copyright Law for
Streaming Services 
A. The Emergence of Online Systems
Streaming is the digital distribution of audio or video content online.11
Distributing music via internet radio format is known as “webcasting.”12  
The handful of early twenty-four hour internet radio stations include Virgin 
Radio in London and Sonicwave.com, which was supported by webcasting 
licenses from the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers 
(“ASCAP”) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”).13  Like terrestrial radio, 
webcasters were required to compensate music composers via publishing 
royalties paid to ASCAP, BMI, and (when necessary) the smaller PRO 
“SESAC,” originally known as the Society of European Stage Authors and 
Composers.14   
Pursuant to the Sound Recording Act of 1971, holders of sound 
recording copyrights “had no right to extract licensing fees from radio 
stations and other broadcasters.”15  The recording industry recognized a 
mutual benefit in radio broadcasts; their music would receive free 
advertising and lead consumers to purchase music, while radio broadcasters 
would gain a listening audience.16  Therefore while two copyrights are 
inherent in every song—the sound recording and the underlying 
composition—both satellite and terrestrial radio providers were only 
obligated to pay for the underlying composition via royalties to publishers 
and composers.17   
“With the inception and public use of the internet in the early 1990s, 
the recording industry became concerned that existing copyright law was 
insufficient to protect the industry from music piracy.”18  The Recording 
Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) was primarily concerned that if 
internet users could listen to broadcast music on the internet for free, they 
would stop purchasing music.19  This led to the amendment of the exclusive 
11. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 17 (2004). 
12. Id. at 4.
13. Ozzki.com, History of Online Radio, http://www.phats.co.uk/History%20of% 20online
%20radio.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
14. The Music Royalty Breakdown, INDIE AND UNSIGNED (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.indie
andunsigned.com/the-music-royalty-breakdown/. 
15. Arista Records LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F. 3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2009).
16. Id.
17. The Music Royalty Breakdown, supra note 14.
18. Arista Records, 578 F. 3d 148, at 153.
19. Id.
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rights provision in the Copyright Act.  Codified as part of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 114 created a statutory 
basis for performance royalties to be paid for satellite and internet radio 
broadcasts in addition to publishing royalties.20  Unlike terrestrial radio 
providers that only paid composers, webcasters were faced with the initial 
obligation of paying the owners of the sound recording—the record 
company.21 
The distinction between interactive and non-interactive webcasts 
further modified the royalty fee.  Interactive webcasts are entitled to 
individual licensing fees under the DMCA while noncustomizable or 
noninteractive services pay to statutory licenses.22  The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals scrutinized the applicability of interactive and 
noninteractive website distinctions to internet radio in Arista Records, LLC 
v. Launch Media, Inc.23
Arista Records and a collection of similarly situated record companies
brought suit against Launch Media, Inc. for its webcasting service 
LAUNCHcast.24  LAUNCHcast allowed users to create stations that were 
customizable by genre, artist, or song.25  Arista argued that the 
customizable service violated its exclusive right to the sound recordings 
played because Launch had failed to pay an individual licensing fee for its 
service.26  Launch rebutted that the service was noninteractive, thus subject 
to the statutory fee set by the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”).27 
The Second Circuit looked to the statutory definition of “interactive” 
and “noninteractive” to categorize the LAUNCHcast program and establish 
any liability.  According to 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7), an interactive service is a 
service that “enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a 
program specially created for the recipient, or on request.”28  Otherwise, if 
a digital audio transmission is not interactive, its primary purpose is to 
“provide to the public such audio or other entertainment programming,” 
subject to a compulsory or statutory licensing fee.29  Thus, the court had to 
determine if a webcasting service such as LAUNCHcast was interactive 
20. Id. at 152.
21. Id.; see generally The Music Royalty Breakdown, supra note 14.
22. Id. at 154.
23. 578 F. 3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009).
24. Id. at 150.
25. Id. at 157–58.
26. Id. at 151.
27. Id.
28. 578 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 2009).
29. Id. at 151.
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based on whether the user could receive a transmission specially created for 
him or her.30 
Assessing the format of the LAUNCHcast song selection process, the 
court declared that the system was noninteractive according to the statute.31  
Although users could input various factors to determine the type of song 
that would play, they never had the ability to choose certain songs.32  
Instead, LAUNCHcast had algorithms in place that would select which 
songs to play from its finite set, based on user ratings of similar songs.33  
The user was not allowed to restart any song that was playing, nor repeat 
any of the previously played songs in the playlist.34  LAUNCHcast also 
limited the number of songs played from one artist in order to increase 
variety beyond the user’s initial preferences.35  Therefore, since 
LAUNCHcast users could not expect to hear songs on demand, nor 
specially craft each song on the playlist, the court held that the system did 
not meet the interactive definition.36 
Since the Arista decision, several internet radio and music subscription 
services have been developed and categorized as either interactive or 
noninteractive.  Services such as Rhapsody and Spotify allow users to 
select specific songs to add to playlists and play on demand, thus they are 
interactive services subject to royalties for each song.37  Meanwhile, 
noninteractive services such as Pandora do not allow users to select specific 
songs and therefore pay a performance royalty based on the statutory rate.38 
When songs are streamed in the United States, the royalties are 
“deducted by the digital store and held” until the songwriter or publisher 
informs the service where to send the royalties.39  Any streams outside of 
the United States are processed by local collection societies, like the 
Performing Rights Society for Music in the United Kingdom (“PRS for 
Music”), the Japanese Society for Rights, Authors, Composers, and 
Publishers (“JASRAC”), or the German Society for Musical Performing 
30. Id. at 152.
31. Id. at 164.
32. Id. at 159.
33. Arista Records, 578 F.3d 148, 160 (2d Cir. 2009).
34. Id. at 158.
35. Id. at 160.
36. Id. at 160–61.
37. Doug Freeman, Pennies From Heaven: The New Streaming Economy is Here, with or
Without Royalties, AUSTIN CHRONICLE, May 18, 2012, http://www.austin chronicle.com/music/ 
2012-05-18/pennies-from-heaven/. 
38. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(d), (j)(7) (2012).
39. Jamie Purpora, How We’re Getting Your Mechanicals from Streams, TUNECORE BLOG
(Nov. 8, 2012), http://blog.tunecore.com/2012/11/how-were-getting-your-mechanicals-from-stre 
ams.html/. 
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and Production Rights (Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und 
mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte or “GEMA”).40  Both interactive and 
non-interactive services pay performance royalties to composers and music 
publishers through performing rights organizations (“PROs”).41  In addition 
interactive services pay performance royalties for sound recordings through 
negotiations with each label, while noninteractive services pay the 
compulsory rate through the nonprofit digital collection agency 
SoundExchange.42 
B. Current Models and Problems
While the latest internet radios sites have fallen into their respective
webcast designations, they are not free from all royalty issues.  Pandora, 
one of the most successful internet radio platforms to date, has recently lost 
favor in the artistic community.  Pandora launched in 2005 as a 
personalized radio experience.43  Taking the LAUNCHcast concept a step 
further, Pandora uses the Music Genome Project to break down a song’s 
“DNA”—rhythm, genre, vocal stylization, and instrumentation—to suggest 
songs for users.44  Once a new song appears on the user’s playlist, he/she 
can like it, skip it, or merely listen.45  By allowing users to customize their 
playlists after one song based on liking or adding additional songs and 
elements, Pandora has garnered an audience of over two hundred million 
users.46 
As a noninteractive webcaster, Pandora pays two types of performance 
royalties: statutory performance royalties for the sound recording and 
performance royalties for the underlying composition.47  As stated earlier, 
statutory performance royalties for digital music are paid to the nonprofit 
organization SoundExchange, which collects the royalties and disperses 
them back out to artists and record companies.48  Writers’ royalties are paid 
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Press Room: About Pandora, PANDORA, http://pandora.com/press (last visited Jan. 20,
2013). 
44. Id.
45. Company Overview, PANDORA BLOG, http://blog.pandora.com/press/pandora-company-
over view.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
46. Jordan Crook, Pandora Surpasses 200 Million Registered Users, 140 Million Access Via
Mobile, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 9, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/ 2013/04/09/pandora-surpasses-200-
million-registered-users-140-million-access-via-mobile/. 
47. Joey Flores, The Downfall of Pandora, Consumer Choice and Emerging Music,
HYPEBOT (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2012/11/the-downfall-of-pandora-
consumer-choice-and-emerging-music.html. 
48. Id.
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out to the PROs ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC.49  Unlike satellite radio 
providers like Sirius, which pay a percentage of its revenue as performance 
royalties, Pandora pays a per-stream fee every time a song is played.50  This 
“willing buyer, willing seller” model is still based on the statutory rate, but 
does not account for the internal performance of the company.51  As a 
result, Pandora paid out royalties of sixty percent, fifty percent, and fifty-
four percent of its revenue in fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012 
respectively.52  Unfortunately, while Pandora is one of the first radio 
systems to fairly pay record companies and artists, the payments are 
essentially killing the company. 
Pandora and a handful of other internet radio providers are looking to 
alter the “willing buyer, willing seller” model with the Internet Radio 
Fairness Act.53  Introduced in the House of Representatives in September 
2012, the bill would shift noninteractive webcast services to the satellite 
radio model.54  Instead of paying half of its revenue to SoundExchange, 
Pandora could adopt Sirius’s eight percent rate.55  Not surprisingly, artists 
and record companies condemn the bill as Pandora’s attempt to “pad [its] 
pockets” instead of generating more revenue through advertising.56   
What the labels and artists fail to realize is the service offered by 
Pandora essentially democratizes the digital marketplace.  Unlike broadcast 
radio, which offers a static set of music, Pandora’s customizability offers 
an array of music to users from obscure ska for hardcore reggae lovers to 
Top 40 for teens.57  Doing so recognizes niches of users and in turn pays 
artists that would otherwise not be discovered.  Without a way to protect 
this customizability while also paying a feasible amount of royalties, 
Pandora and services like it will bulk up their playlists with advertisements 
or focus more on mainstream artists until they become as homogenized as 
their predecessors.54  
49. See generally The Music Royalty Breakdown, supra note 14.
50. Geoff Morris, Pandora Versus Musicians – Internet Radio Fairness Act, ASU SPORTS 
AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL BLOG (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.sportsandentertainmentlawblog.com/2012/10/pandora-musicians-internet-radio -
fairness-act/. 
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Ben Sisario, Proposed Bill Could Change Royalty Rates for Internet Radio, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/business/media/proposed-bill-could-change-
royalty-rates-for-internet-radio.html?_r=0. 
55. See Flores, supra note 47.
56. See Flores, supra note 47.
57. See Flores, supra note 47.
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Despite not turning an annual profit in its seven-year history, Pandora 
continues to survive by increasing its user base across multiple platforms. 
Since 2010, it has launched on over two hundred consumer electronic 
devices including Blu-Ray players, smartphones, and cars.58  In 2011, 
Pandora was the number two all-time downloaded free iPhone app and the 
number one all-time downloaded free iPad app.59  Now, mobile use 
contributes to seventy-five percent of Pandora’s 3.3 billion annual total 
listener hours.60  In addition, Pandora expanded internationally in 
December 2012 by launching online and on mobile devices in Australia 
and New Zealand.61  The company has transplanted its customization to 
Oceania by offering playlists based on local hits or featuring local artists in 
addition to its ten thousands songs already recognized through the Music 
Genome Project.62  Slowly but surely, Pandora is contributing to the global 
fight against online piracy by offering users customizable platforms and 
providing a potentially viable revenue stream for artists. 
Record labels and their artists are fighting the Internet Radio Fairness 
Act with so much vigor because online music has become their main 
source of revenue.  In 2011, digital music sales surpassed physical sales for 
the first time in history.63  Digital music took 50.3% of the market share, an 
increase of 8.4% from 2010, while physical sales dropped by five percent.64  
Just nine years ago the bestselling physical album of the year would have 
sold ten million copies, but last year it was Adele’s 21 selling just 5.8 
million records.65  Compare that to Nicki Minaj’s single “Super Bass,” 
which was the most streamed song and music video in 2011 with 84.9 
million audio streams and 71 million video streams.66  Record companies 
desperately need to support legitimate music platforms online in order to 
stay profitable. 
Since the implementation of the DMCA, the RIAA and the Motion 
Picture Association of America (“MPAA”) have put more energy into 
shutting down illegal digital services than supporting legitimate 
58. Company Overview, PANDORA BLOG, http://blog.pandora.com/press/pandora-company-
overview.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
59. Id.
60. Pandora Refreshes its Mobile Apps, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 2012, http://www.usatoday.
com/story/tech/personal/2012/10/29/pandora-refreshes-its-mobile-apps/1667745/. 
61. Etherington, supra note 7.
62. Id.
63. Sam Gustin, Digital Music Sales Finally Surpassed Physical Sales in 2011, TIME, Jan.
6, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/01/06/digital-music-sales-finally-surpassed-phys ical-
sales-in-2011/. 
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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alternatives.  In MGM Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., this coalition of content 
owners brought suit against Grokster, which allowed computer users to 
share copyrighted files through peer-to-peer networks.67  The group of 
movie studios and labels argued that Grokster “knowingly and intentionally 
distributed their software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works.”68  
Billions of files had been shared across the network, ninety percent of 
which were considered illegal copies.69  The Court imposed liability on 
Grokster for its contributory infringement because it facilitated files that it 
knew to be infringing material in order to profit from advertising revenue.70  
In short, the Court held that a company that “distributes a device with the 
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright . . . is liable for the 
resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”71  After successfully 
shutting down Grokster in this Supreme Court case and similar company 
LimeWire in 2010, the entertainment industry slowly began countering the 
effects of digital media.72  
Like music sales, the film industry’s physical sales are losing ground 
against digital distribution.  Last year purchases of Blu-ray and DVD 
movies were expected to fall for the second year in a row to 2.4 billion, 
while legally downloaded movies were expected to outperform those disc 
sales.73  The year 2012 became the tipping point as “U.S. consumers 
[made] a historic switch to internet-based consumption.”74  Indeed, the film 
industry’s crown jewel has been Netflix, which makes up a bulk of 
subscription, non-physical viewing.75  With nearly twenty-three million 
subscribers, Netflix offers flat rate DVD-by-mail services and streaming of 
over 100,000 titles.76  The latter service has surpassed physical sales; in 
67. 545 U.S. 913, 919–20 (2005).
68. Id. at 920–21.
69. Id. at 933.
70. Id. at 914.
71. Id. at 918.
72. See generally Arista Records LLC v. LimeWire LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), in which the district court granted plaintiffs their motion for permanent injunction against 
LimeWire for inducement of copyright infringement, common law infringement, and unfair 
competition. 
73. Justin Massoud, U.S. Online Movies to Top Physical Media in 2012, MYCE (Mar. 23,
2012), http://www.myce.com/news/u-s-online-movies-to-top-physical-media-in-2012-60581/. 
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Dan Sabbagh, Hollywood in Turmoil as DVD Sales Drop and Downloads Steal the
Show, THE GUARDIAN, May 3, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/ 2011/may/03/film-
industry-turmoil-as-dvd-sales-drop. 
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2011 the total digital revenue for Netflix reached $1.5 billion.77  In turn, 
Netflix paid film companies $192 million for its streaming rights and 
another $377 million to rightsholders from its subscription service.78 
In addition to offering a wide array of titles, Netflix gauges consumer 
interests and offers customized suggestions for new films based on those 
interests.79  Like Pandora, Netflix has become an industry leader because it 
has created a user-friendly interface that assesses the interests of its 
participants rather than dictates what is displayed or heard.  Instead of 
facilitating piracy like Grokster and digital media platforms before them, 
these two companies have contracted extensively with rightsholders to 
legitimize their content.   
Granting performance rights for audiovisual works such as film and 
television programs is not nearly as contentious as obtaining similar rights 
for music.  The exclusive right of a copyright holder to perform and 
reproduce its audiovisual work is granted by 17 U.S.C. § 106.80  As owners 
of these works studios negotiate licenses directly with potential service 
providers, and, like record labels, prefer to charge high licensing fees 
upfront to compensate for lackluster physical sales.81  As a result Netflix 
may offer television series and film collections from a certain group of 
studios while growing competitor Amazon may host content from another 
handful of producers.82   
For Netflix, country-by-country negotiations have appeared to work 
seamlessly, and the company has since expanded to over forty countries, 
including Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.83  On the other 
hand, Pandora has been stalled in its expansion because of varying royalty 
rates for terrestrial, satellite, and internet radio.  Regardless, both platforms 
have helped shift the entertainment industry from lackluster physical sales 
and infringement litigation to thriving digital economies.  “Only by 
77. Letter from Netflix to Shareholders (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://files.shareholder.
com/downloads/NFLX/2316572145x0x536469/7d1a24b7-c8cc-4f19-a1dd-225a335dabc4/Inv-est 
or%20Letter%20Q4%202011.pdf. 
78. Glenn Peoples, What the Music Business Can Learn from Netflix’s Success, BILLBOARD
MAGAZINE, Apr. 26, 2011, http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/ news/1178198/what-the-
music-business-can-learn-from-netflixs-success. 
79. How Netflix Works, NETFLIX, https://signup.netflix.com/MediaCenter/ HowNetflixWorks
(last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
80. Id.
81. Dan Rayburn, Stream This!: Netflix’s Streaming Costs, STREAMINGMEDIA.COM 
(June/July 2009), http://www.streamingmedia.com/Articles/Editorial/Featured-Articles/ Stream-
This!-Net flixs-Streaming-Costs-65503.aspx. 
82. Brian Stelter, A CBS Deal Bolsters Amazon’s Challenge to Netflix, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11,
2013), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/amazon-and-cbs-announce-deal-on-
rights-to-under-the-dome/. 
83. See Pepitone, supra note 9; see also McGlaun, supra note 9.
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offering consumers easy-to-access digital streaming services that have total 
selection and competitive pricing will the industry keep honest consumers 
from resorting to piracy.”84  Nonetheless, when countries with prohibitive 
copyright systems inhibit digital streaming, piracy will continue to be a 
prevailing issue. 
III. Analysis: Multinational Copyright Systems
A. The Effects of the Berne Convention
Online streaming services would expand more rapidly if the copyright
system were unified among countries.  Currently, the closest that countries 
have come to a universal copyright system are the protection standards 
implemented through international treaties.  Copyright protection standards 
were first ratified in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”).85  The Berne Convention 
promulgated minimum standards for copyright protection and required its 
signatories to provide the same level of protection to foreign creations as 
their own domestic works.86  The United International Bureau for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property (known by its French acronym “BIRPI”) 
was established in 1893 to administer the convention.87   
In 1960, BIRPI became the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”) when the organization underwent structural changes and moved 
from Berne to Geneva.88  WIPO administered the Berne Convention 
agreement in addition to other agreements on intellectual property rights, 
but failed to standardize intellectual property law as a whole.89  Key to 
WIPO’s weakness was its inability to provide an “adequate dispute 
settlement mechanism,” and countries such as the US began to take matters 
into their own hands by enforcing intellectual property rights within trade 
regulation.90  The matter was resolved when the Berne Convention was 
synthesized into the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) in 1996.91  As part of the new World Trade 
84. Sage Vanden Heuvel, Fighting the First Sale Doctrine: Strategies for a Struggling Film
Industry, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 661, 687 (2012). 
85. SIMON LESTER ET AL., WORLD TRADE LAW: TEXT, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY
705 (1st ed. 2008). 
86. Id. at 704-05.
87. WIPO Treaties—General Information, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ en/general/
(last visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. LESTER, supra note 85, at 706.
91. Id.
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Organization (“WTO”), intellectual property rights in TRIPS now had the 
minimum standards of the Berne Convention reinforced by the dispute 
settlement mechanisms of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”).92  Now, 159 countries adhere to minimum copyright protection 
standards in exchange for free trade among member nations.93 
The threat of trade concessions as enabled by the WTO has forced 
countries to comply with TRIPS even amidst domestic contention. 
Specifically, Golan v. Holder exemplifies how international trade law can 
be exercised over domestic preferences for using copyrighted works.94  In 
2001, a collection of composers, publishers, videographers, and 
audio/video retailers challenged the constitutionality of Section 514 of the 
URAA, as implemented in 17 U.S.C. § 104A.95  The complainants argued 
that the measure violated the limited times provision of the Copyright 
Clause and infringed upon the freedom of expression principles of the First 
Amendment by pulling works out of the public domain.96  The Court struck 
down both constitutional challenges to the measure, holding that restoration 
as a means of complying with the Berne Convention was not retroactive in 
that it recognized the rules promulgated in 1989 when the Berne 
Convention was first implemented.97  
Most of the works involved—Peter and the Wolf, Metropolis, and the 
string quartets of Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich’s  were accessible 
in the United States only through low-cost sheet music and recording 
compilations made possible because they were not subject to copyright 
royalties.98  Now, the composers, publishers, and videographers that acted 
as a medium to deliver these works to another generation of consumers 
have been unnecessarily hindered by a copyright regime that does more to 
stifle creativity than incentivize creators.99  By retroactively restoring 
copyright protection to foreign works, the effect of TRIPS on the United 
States’s legislative scheme has been to stifle expression of older works.100  
The result of Golan demonstrates the influence that international copyright 
law exerts over minimum standards of protection.  If the WTO can be 
92. Id.
93. See generally Understanding the WTO: The Organization, http://wto.org/english/ the
wto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).  As of March 2, 2013, there are 159 
members of the WTO.  Id. 
94. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
95. Id. at 874, 883.
96. Id. at 883.
97. Id. at 894.
98. Id. at 883.
99. Gard, supra note 4, at 153.
100. Id.
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harnessed to impose protection standards, it can also be used to generate 
minimum standards of royalty computation for digital distribution systems 
among member nations. 
B. Previous Approaches to Multinational Licensing
1. Country-by-Country Negotiations
In the absence of minimum standards for royalty computation, current
market leaders for streaming services have painstakingly acquired separate 
licenses for each country in which they stream.  Based in Sweden, Spotify 
is a digital music service that offers a “freemium” model for listening—
users have either free ad-supported access to music or can pay for an 
advertisement-free premium service.101  Unlike Pandora, Spotify is an 
interactive streaming service that must negotiate performance royalties 
with each label to obtain the rights to perform the sound recordings.102  The 
payoff though is a truly on-demand music service that allows users to fully 
customize playlists and avoid the song-skipping limitations of services like 
Pandora. 
Spotify launched in 2008 as a “good quality, legal” alternative for users 
craving a massive music selection online.103  It has been appropriately 
labeled a “piracy killer,” as a 2011 survey showed that illegal downloading 
in Sweden had decreased by more than twenty-five percent since the 
service started.104  Twenty-three percent of users polled admitted that they 
still pirated music, but Spotify’s quality and track availability have helped 
drastically lower these numbers since 2009.105  By 2009, Spotify had 
rapidly made its way through most of Europe—including the UK, Finland, 
Sweden, Norway, France, Italy, and Spain—”cutting down the interest 
towards illegal music downloads.”106  However the company met the most 
difficulty when trying to permeate the world’s largest music market—the 
United States. 
By 2010 Spotify had attempted to launch in the United States twice. 
The company struggled to secure licensing rights from the four (now three) 
101. Ben Sisario, Spotify Loss Widens Despite Higher Revenue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/spotify-loss-widens-despite-higher-revenue/. 
102. Id.
103. Petteri Pyyny, Spotify, ‘the Music Piracy Killer,’ is Expanding to U.S., AFTERDAWN
(July 20, 2009), http://www.afterdawn.com/news/article.cfm/2009/07/
20/spotify_the_music_piracykiller_is_expanding_to_u_s. 
104. Id.
105. Sean F., Swedish Survey Shows Legal Streaming Services, Like Spotify, Is a Piracy
Killer, DIGITAL DIGEST (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.digital-digest.com/news-63151-Swedish-
Survey-Shows-Legal-Streaming-Services-Like-Spotify-Is-A-Piracy-Killer.html 
106. Pyyny, supra note 103.
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major record labels: Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, 
Warner Music Group, and EMI Music.107  The labels were unsure about 
Spotify’s ability to adequately pay for music; Apple also quipped that the 
free service would undercut its download sales.108  Therefore, the labels 
initially required prohibitively high licensing fees upfront to mitigate the 
risk of losing downloading users.109  Moreover, by the time Spotify 
attempted to launch streaming services Imeem, Spiral Frog, and MySpace 
Music had all failed.110  Record labels had simply lost faith in freemium 
models. 
Understandably, labels balked at the idea of a streaming service that 
brought in lower royalties per song than downloads.  Yet with “a large 
enough listener base” Spotify and services like it would bring in substantial 
revenue.111  After finally reaching the United States in July 2011, Spotify 
jumped from 750,000 paying subscribers and millions of free listeners to 
1.6 million subscribers.112  Now, the company is “believed to have more 
than 10 million total users.”113  Although royalties are still only pennies on 
the dollar, due to the large volume of streaming traffic Spotify is able to 
bring in $71 million from its subscribers and $28 million in advertising to 
pay out to artists.114  The Spotify model is now heralded as the leading 
digital music service, with the average band’s revenue increasing steadily 
over the past year and a half.115 
The subscription service model with ad-supported streaming has also 
expanded into the film and television industry.  Hulu launched in 2007 as a 
joint venture between NBC Universal, NewsCorp, and Disney-ABC 
Television Group.116  The service offers video-on-demand trailers, clips, 
behind-the-scenes footage, full films, and full television shows.117  The ad-
supported model streams videos with brief interruptions modeled after 
broadcast television, while the premium model eliminates ad interruption 
107. Greg Sandoval, Spotify Crashes into Apple on the Way to U.S., CNET NEWS (Oct. 7,
2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20018971-261.html. 
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Sisario, supra note 101.
114. Id.
115. Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: A Brief History of Spotify Royalties, BILLBOARD 
MAGAZINE, Aug. 30, 2012, www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1083980/ business-matters-a-
brief-history-of-spotify-royalties. 
116. Janet Morrissey, Hulu’s Network Drama, CNN MONEY (Aug. 20, 2012), http://tech.fortu
ne.cnn.com/ 2012/08/20/hulu-problems-kilar/. 
117. Id.
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and offers more content, such as the whole current season of a listed show 
instead of the latest episode.118 
Hulu has managed to license content from over 380 content providers 
and streams video for major cable companies and web portals such as 
AOL, MSN, and Yahoo.119  With its licensing and distribution deals Hulu 
accumulated $420 million in revenue in 2011 and had more than two 
million paying subscribers as of 2012.120  Nevertheless, its owners 
consistently hinder the streaming of its core product, recently aired 
programming.  A 2010 IPO never launched because the three leading 
owners—NBC, NewsCorp (which owns the Fox networks), and ABC—
refused to relinquish control of their content.121  The three even had 
difficulty acquiring the licensing rights from the fourth major broadcaster 
CBS, which finally offered up over 2,600 episodes starting January 
2013.122   
Domestic contention over licensing rights has stymied the growth of 
Hulu in other territories.  Hulu has tried to expand to England and Ireland 
for over three years but has yet to do so because of content disputes among 
American broadcasters and U.K. distributors.123  In contrast, Netflix just 
launched in these two territories in early 2012.124  Part of the reason Netflix 
has been such a success where Hulu has failed is because Netflix streams 
full past seasons of current or library shows, while Hulu contracts for 
current-season programming.125   
Like the major record labels just a few years ago, content proliferators 
in film and television do not want to give up initial airings on traditional 
media platforms in exchange for digital platforms.  As a result, Hulu is 
currently available outside the United States only in Japan, where it 
launched in 2011.126  The Japanese subscription service offers access to 
popular shows such as Grey’s Anatomy and films such as Pirates of the 
Caribbean along with local content.127  Meanwhile the music industry has 
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Chris Welch, CBS Finally Embraces Hulu, Signs Licensing Agreement for Over 2,600
Episodes, THE VERGE (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.theverge.com/2012/11/5/360 5526/cbs-hulu-
plus-licensing-agreement. 
123. Robert Andrews, Netflix Cleared for UK & Ireland Take-Off Early in 2012: TV and
Movies, PAID CONTENT (Oct. 24, 2011), http://paidcontent.org/2011/10/24/419-netflix-cleared-
for-uk-ireland-take-off-early-in-2012-tv-and-movies/. 
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Lawler, supra note 9.
127. Id.
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all but abandoned the physical market for album sales and instead is more 
willing to license to digital media platforms.   
Upon analysis of current country-by-country licensing efforts, it is 
clear that countries prefer to keep their autonomy when providing 
copyright protection within their territories.  Absent any international 
agreements to the contrary, digital media service providers can continue to 
anticipate cumbersome negotiation efforts with rightsholders in various 
territories.  Only when countries can agree on basic standards for licensing 
and fee structures can companies avoid costly barriers to entry into the 
digital market. 
2.Regional Negotiations
In November 2012 the EU issued a Directive on “the collective 
management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing 
of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market.”128  The 
EU noted that collection societies such as PRS for Music and GEMA are 
essential cogs in the process of licensing digital media through streaming 
services.129  Since most online users are not aware of territorial boundaries, 
collection societies are “increasingly requested to grant licenses that cover 
several or all Member states.”130  Current copyright directives do not offer 
any guidelines for managing rights involving several countries, and as a 
result online service providers must combine a cumbersome number of 
multi-territory licenses with territorial licenses to legally distribute their 
services.131  Overall the EU Directive argues that the current process is time 
consuming and potentially cost prohibitive for smaller distributors that do 
not have the capacity and technical resources to keep up with such 
extensive licensing.132 
The EU insists that the grant of multi-territory licenses for musical 
works be facilitated through transparent accounting by collection societies. 
Its optimal proposed approach is a “governance and transparency 
128. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Collective
Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Music 
Works for Online Uses in the Internal Market, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  (July 11, 2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/com-2012-3722_en.pdf (hereinafter 
referred to as “Directive”). 
129. Id. at 2.
130. Commission Staff Working Document: Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2 (July 17, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/research/ science-
society/document_library/pdf_06/impact-assessement-executive-summary_en.pdf (hereinafter 
referred to as “Executive Summary”). 
131. Id.
132. Id. at 3–4.
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framework” combined with the “European Licensing Passport.”133  
Governance and Transparency (“G&T”) would involve creating “principle-
based rules” which would improve current financial management and 
increase rightsholders’ control over collection societies.134  All rules 
governing rights management would be set out in one instrument providing 
for their visibility, understanding and enforceability.135  Existing EU rules 
on collective rights management as well as nonbinding recommendations 
would be codified and exercised among all Member States.136  Further, 
under this option a Member State is required to impose sanctions for 
breaches of G&T obligations.137   
The European Licensing Passport will complement the G&T by 
encouraging rightsholders to aggregate their repertoires for online use.138  
The Passport will act as a vehicle for licenses by encouraging rightsholders 
to license their rights through effective multi-territorial licensing 
infrastructures.139  The infrastructures they use will be preselected with set 
conditions to “ensure sufficient data handling and invoicing capabilities.”140  
The EU believes that market forces will force the Passport to become just 
one aggregate market that will simplify transactions, require fewer licenses 
to be negotiated, and improve the quality of these services with more 
efficient accounting.141 
The availability of a less cumbersome and more cost efficient licensing 
system among Member States will entice not only more digital music 
services to enter the marketplace but also offer more variety to users in 
niche markets.142  Efficient collection societies with streamlined 
multinational licenses eliminate the need to negotiate each agreement by 
country, which allows even the “smallest and less popular repertoires to 
access the market.”143  Furthermore, transparent rules governing licensing 
across national borders will strengthen current services, creating more 
transparent collection societies to maximize revenue for rightsholders and 
foster diversity for consumers.144  When passed, the Directive will be 
133. Id. at 6–7.
134. Id. at 5.
135. Directive, supra note 128, at 35.
136. Id. at 151.
137. Id. at 135.
138. Executive Summary, supra note 130, at 5.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Directive, supra note 128, at 163.
142. Executive Summary, supra note 130, at 4.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id. at 2.
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implemented through workshops within each Member State to facilitate the 
exchange of necessary information.145 
IV. Proposal: The International Market for
Music and Film Performance 
A. The Impact of PTAs on the Global Marketplace
Depending upon the success of the Directive, multi-territorial licensing
could be adopted by North American countries and Asian partners as well, 
reducing the number of tedious steps for digital service providers.  Within 
the WTO, plurilateral trade agreements (“PTAs”) are able to address 
regional concerns that would otherwise be overlooked in multilateral 
agreements such as TRIPS.146  PTAs create an exception to the national 
treatment provision of the WTO by allowing signatories to create optimal 
trading relationships with their geographical neighbors beyond general 
GATT provisions.147  PTAs can establish prototypes for liberalization in a 
variety of regional trading areas, and persuade other Members to comply in 
order to compete on a global scale.148 
Specifically for licensing services, adopting the Directive as a PTA, 
would enable EU member countries to generate measures for collection 
societies that protect copyright beyond the basic provisions of TRIPS. 
PTAs also have the potential to alter market forces outside of their 
signatories, which could lead trading partners in North America and 
throughout Asia to adopt similar standards.149  Film and television 
companies as well as PROs already include the U.S. territories of the 
Caribbean and Puerto Rico within licensing agreements as standard 
language.  Generating a PTA recognizing a single licensing process 
throughout the Americas is not a stretch. 
A homogenized digital licensing system between the United States and 
the EU is also aided by the EU’s history of recognizing a performance right 
for both the musical composition and the sound recording.150  For example, 
the United Kingdom manages performance royalties through PRS for 
Music and Phonographic Performance Limited (“PPL”).151  PRS for Music 
145. Id. at 7.
146. LESTER, supra note 85, at 346.
147. Id. at 352.
148. Id. at 347.
149. Id.
150. European Copyright Code, THE WITTEM PROJECT (April 2010), available at
http://www.copyrightcode.eu/Wittem_European_copyright_code_21%20april%202010.pdf. 
151. What We Do, PPL: STANDING UP FOR MUSIC RIGHTS, http://www.ppluk.com/ About-
Us/What-We-Do/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
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acts as a traditional PRO by paying publishers and composers, while PPL 
pays record companies as the sound recording owners.152  Unlike in the 
United States, most European nations have always recognized a 
performance right for sound recordings, whether in terrestrial radio or 
online streaming.153  Therefore, an international collection agency modeled 
after the EU Directive and coupled with the function of traditional PROs 
and digital rights managers, like SoundExchange and PPL, is a feasible 
vehicle for online streaming services. 
B. Cultural Protectionism as a Barrier to Entry
A potential barrier to the development of a global market for media
licensing is culture.  Certain WTO members are notorious for objecting to 
international measures that compromise the development of domestic 
culture.  Canada has practiced cultural protectionism for decades, imposing 
substantial tariffs on American literature and limiting the amount of foreign 
media that enters the country.154  China has also limited the amount of 
foreign media through content reviews and a cap on the number of foreign 
films available for theatrical distribution.155  However as mentioned earlier, 
consumers always find a way to access restricted content, and without 
legitimate services in place their demand will “be filled only by 
pirat[ing].”156  
Member countries like China often comply with international copyright 
measures when national interests are at stake.  For example, China 
“strongly enforced copyrights relating to online broadcasts of the Beijing 
152. Id.
153. The Law, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/about/the-law/ (last visited
Mar. 8, 2013). 
154. See generally Imaginary to the Death?  Free Trade, National Identity, and Canada’s
Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 203 (1998); see also Panel Report, 
Canada—Periodicals, WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 1997); and Appellate Body Report, Canada—
Periodicals, WT/DS31/R (June 30, 1997) in which the United States successfully challenged 
Canada’s ban on it special edition Sports Illustrated which targeted advertisements to Canada. 
The Appellate Body held that Canada’s tax on foreign publications discriminatory in violation of 
the national treatment provision in the GATT. 
155. Charlotte R. Lane et. al., China: Intellectual Property Infringement, Indigenous
Innovation Policies, and Frameworks for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. Economy, U.S. 
INTERN. TRADE COM’N 1, 45 (2010 WL 5474164).  As a result of extensive content reviews on 
video games and music consumers seek pirated copies and weaken legitimate sales.  Further 
China limits the number of foreign films for theatrical distribution to twenty.  See also Appellate 
Body Report, China—Publications and Audiovisual Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009), 
in which the Appellate Body held that China denied national treatment to the United States for 
imported reading materials, sound recordings, and films.  As of May 24, 2012, China reported 
that it complied with the Dispute Settlement Body recommendations. 
156. See Lane, supra note 153, at 45.
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Olympics.”157  In 2008, China Central Television, NBC, and the 
International Olympic Committee shut down or blocked over a hundred 
sites infringing network broadcasts.158  Meanwhile, NBC made coverage 
“globally available through legal outlets” including television, mobile 
phones, and online at NBColympics.com.159  Through collective 
enforcement, China made a crucial finding: “the widespread availability of 
legal broadcasts . . . likely reduced demand for unauthorized videos.”160 
Dispute settlement procedures against countries like Canada and China 
are unnecessary when online services allow users to customize content 
based on location and preferences.  Although it is not yet a breakthrough 
hit with consumers, Hulu in Japan exemplifies what film and television 
streaming can become in the future.161  The legal, subscription-based 
service couples local programming with international blockbusters to 
satisfy its audience country to country.162  The same is evident for Pandora, 
whose Australia and New Zealand platforms host local musicians as well as 
international hits.163  The accessibility and customizability of digital 
streaming services can combat the global plague of piracy and protect the 
cultural concerns of participating countries. 
C. Creating the Global Marketplace
The EU Directive on promoting transparency and streamlined
registration with collection agencies throughout territories can be a model 
for digital distribution systems in music, film, and television.  In regards to 
music, existing collection agencies can form a syndicate with emerging 
digital collection societies.  Territories that recognize performance rights 
for sound recordings could also pool their collection societies into the 
syndicate.  Admission into the syndicate and thus the advantage of global 
streaming services will hinge upon the existence of collection societies for 
both sound recordings and musical compositions.  Since the United States 
is one of only a few countries that does not recognize the right of 
performance for broadcasted sound recordings yet has modified its laws for 
digital sound recordings, it follows that other WTO member countries that 
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Sam Byford, Japan’s Digital Content Struggles, the Country of the Future Remains
Stuck in the Past, THE VERGE (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.theverge.com/ 
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have already recognized such broadcast right have likely already modified 
their laws to encompass digital transmissions.  
The syndicate of collection societies would be set up through WIPO 
and run by a standing committee made up of representatives from each 
member country.  The syndicate would mitigate country-by-country 
negotiations by regulating royalty payments by service providers to 
rightsholders.  Further, initial licensing negotiations will require a 
consideration of local culture, ensuring that member nations such as 
Canada and China would be able to control to a limited degree the foreign 
content that is streamed.  As a result, the streaming service will maintain its 
customizability to consumers while reinforcing local culture. 
The syndicate will work on a reciprocal basis—countries could still 
couple their own content with that of foreign competitors as long as they 
pay the same royalty rate for foreign competitors as their own domestic 
providers.  This promotes the national treatment standard of the GATT that 
has previously been a point of contention for entertainment products. 
Current streaming services, like Pandora, could expand into other countries 
and negotiate licensing agreements with foreign collection societies with 
similar parameters as its domestic licenses.  
The lack of an existing collection agency for commercial audiovisual 
streaming is an advantage to the creation of a global market.  A unified 
collection agency can be created through WIPO with the sole purpose of 
facilitating licensing transactions for online content.  In exchange for the 
ease of having licenses executed and fees collected for them, participating 
studios will be required to license content at a limited rate.  Instead of 
fixing a rate for which content can be licensed, like for musical 
compositions and sound recordings, studios will be subject to a ceiling 
price at which to license their content.   
Implementing a standard license for film and television studios will 
reduce the need for consumers to jump to one streaming service for 
Universal and Twentieth Century Fox films while maintaining another 
service to watch Disney films.  Instead, service providers can proliferate 
content knowing that the fee won’t be cost prohibitive, and studios will 
increase reliance on streaming as the primary platform for their content. 
Although more compliance will be required on behalf of audiovisual 
rightsholders than music rightsholders, the former can take a lesson from 
the music industry.  As evident after the MGM v. Grokster litigation, 
content providers that do not stay abreast of new technology will find their 
consumers turning elsewhere.164  To keep the interest of their audience, 
 164. Although content holders prevailed in their injunction against Grokster on the grounds
of contributory infringement, consumers have since turned to other P2P sites to find potentially 
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studios must eventually comply with online streaming as the new primary 
source of broadcast television, newly released films, and classic content.  
V. Conclusion
In February 2013 the International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (“IFPI”) reported that global sales of music rose last year for the 
first time since 1999.165  Although the increase was a meager 0.3%, the 
IFPI is encouraged that this marks the beginning of a “digital 
revolution.”166  Record label executives such as Edgar Berger of Sony 
Music Entertainment praise digital for “saving music,” while just a decade 
ago digital was thought to be killing the industry.167  Yet the growth is not 
due to the efforts of record labels; it is through online streaming services. 
Last year the number of subscribers to services like Spotify grew forty-four 
percent to twenty million prosumers, and in the US where Spotify was 
initially rejected revenue is expected to rise another thirty million dollars.168  
Film and television studios should take note: “the earlier you can embrace 
new business models and services, the better.”169  While physical sales and 
theater attendance are still falling, video on demand, streaming and film 
sales through services like iTunes rose fifty-one percent last year.170   
A healthy global streaming marketplace is key to facilitating the 
growth of digital media services.  With the advent of a licensing syndicate 
services like Spotify will not take three years to reach one country due to 
extensive negotiations.  Statutory fees would still be in place for 
noninteractive services like Pandora, but with the increased accessibility to 
multiple territories across various platforms these licensing pitfalls can be 
overcome by sheer user volume.   
Film and television services can also become streamlined through 
collection agencies.  A WIPO syndicate modeled after the EU Directive 
would simplify licensing negotiations while also imposing a cap on the 
infringing content for download or streaming.  See generally Glyn Moody Why the Supreme 
Court’s Grokster Decision Led to More, Not Less, P2P Filesharing, TECHDIRT (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111122/06353116873/why-supreme-courts-grokster-decision-
led-to-more-not-less-p2p-filesharing.shtml. 
165. Eric Pfanner, Music Industry Sales Rise, and Digital Revenue Gets the Credit, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/technology/music-industry-records-
first-revenue-increase-since-1999.html. 
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licensing fees promulgated by content holders.  This will ensure that a wide 
array of content is secured for the next Netflix or Amazon service.  Also, 
cultural concerns would be addressed by both music services, as well as, 
film and television platforms by the prosumers themselves; these streaming 
services will be obligated to provide local content alongside international 
media, thereby promoting a healthy domestic base while treating foreign 
works equally.  Prosumers will continue to find the content they desire, and 
rightsholders ready to deliver that content on a global scale will reap the 
benefits of digital streaming revenue.   
